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CHARACTER, VIRTUE AND SELF-INTEREST IN
THE ETHICS OF THE PROFESSIONS
Edmund D. Pellegrino,M.D.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The professions today are afflicted with a species of moral malaise that
may prove fatal to their moral identities and perilous to our whole society.
This malaise is manifest in a growing conviction even among conscientious
doctors, lawyers and ministers that it is no longer possible to practice their
professions within traditional ethical constraints. For reasons which are explained below, this discussion focuses specifically on the "learned" professions: medicine, law and ministry. More specifically, the belief is taking
hold that unless he looks out for his own self-interest, the professional will be
crushed by the forces of commercialization, competition, government regulation, malpractice, advertising, public and media hostility and a host of
other inimical socio-economic forces.
These forces, it is asserted, are conspiring to transform the learned professions into crafts, businesses or technologies. They are beyond the control of
the professions. The fault lies not with the professions. Unless there is some
upheaval in conventional morality, professional ethics as we have known it
has no future. Indeed, perhaps given the realities of professional practice,
professional ethics has rested on faulty philosophical foundations from its
very beginnings. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the selfinterest of the professional justifies the compromises in, and even the rejection of, obligations imposed by traditional concepts of professional ethics.
In this article, strong exception is taken to this line of reasoning both in its
foundations and in its conclusions. I argue to the contrary: 1) that what
deficiencies there are in professional morality are, as they have always been,
deficiencies in character and virtue; 2) that a firm philosophical foundation
exists for altruism and fidelity to trust in the ethics of the professions; 3) that
professional ethics must at times be independent of conventional morality;
and 4) that the professions are moral communities with enormous moral
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power which, properly used, can sustain the moral integrity of the practitioner and the professions. Moreover, if they use their moral power well, the
professions can become paradigms of disinterested service that can raise the
level of conventional morality.
This is an ambitious set of assertions. To speak of character and virtue in
today's moral climate is to be suspected of the sanctimoniousness of hypocrisy. We must admit that the concepts of virtue and character are two of the
oldest and most slippery in moral philosophy. Also, the proper place of selfinterest in virtue ethics has never been satisfactorily settled. Finally, we still
lack a coherent moral philosophy of the professions in which to locate the
concepts of character, altruism and self-interest and to define the relationships between them. These difficulties notwithstanding, we cannot avoid engagement with what I take to be the central crisis in the professions todaythe confusion about who, and what we are, and what we should be.
The moral malaise to which I refer centers on more subtle issues than
those more egregious infractions of professional ethics, which everyone will
condemn. There is no need, therefore, to assault you with a Jeremiad of
gross immorality like incompetence, fraud, deception, mismanagement of
funds, violations of confidentiality, or sexual abuse of clients or patients.
The more immediate concern is with those practices which are more at the
"moral margin." ' These practices are often legal, often socially acceptable
and are often tolerated, though with some misgivings. They occupy a moral
grey zone where the interests of the professional and the patient or client
intersect and where the vulnerability of the latter makes him exploitable by
the former. They are ethical "ozone holes" that open up when moral sensitivities are blunted. Like their physical counterparts at the earth's poles,
ethical ozone holes can spread and have dire consequences unless repaired.
Each of our professions has its own list of morally questionable practices
that its members would justify on the grounds of threatened self-interest. I
will list a few from my own profession and leave to you in law, and the
ministry to fill in your own analogues. For medicine, I would select these
examples: refusing to treat patients with HIV infection for fear of contagion;
denying service to the poor and those with inadequate or exhausted insurance benefits; turning away complicated cases from the emergency room for
fear of malpractice; cooperating with hospital or public policies that require
early discharge; economic transfer or the "dumping" of those who cannot
pay on other hospitals; the various forms of medical entrepreneurism like
1. See Address by S. Linowitz to Cornell Law School (April 15, 1988). This speech by a

distinguished lawyer details some of the ethical lapses at the moral margin in current legal
practice.
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investment in health care facilities; for profit medical ventures of all sorts;
marketing to increase demand for dubious or unnecessary treatment or tests;
and accepting bonuses for denying needed care or enjoying the many emoluments proffered by pharmaceutical companies.
Other professions can draw up their own lists of morally dubious practices. All such practices will, however, have three features in common.
First, they are based on the use of privilege and power for the personal gain
of the professional. Second, they reflect a failure to take certain risks required for the well being of those whom the profession serves. Finally, in the
case of both of these features, justification is sought on the grounds of legitimate self-interest. It is my conviction that these practices and the justification sought for them derive from the de-emphasis on character and virtue in
the three professions we are examining.
In what follows, I will examine three questions about the current moral
malaise of the professions: 1) What are the reasons for the erosion of virtue
ethics and the moral legitimation of self-interest in the ethics of the professions? 2) Is there a philosophical basis for restoring virtue ethics to the professions? 3) What are the practical and theoretical implications of such a
return of virtue ethics? Before examining these questions, I should define
the sense in which I shall use each of the key terms in my title-virtue,
character, profession, ethics of the professions, altruism and self-interest.
The definition of virtue, the virtues and the virtuous person has occupied
philosophers since Plato first raised the question of virtue, its nature, number
and teachability. Despite numerous efforts since then, no one has improved
on Aristotle's imperfect but still useful definition. Aristotle identifies moral
virtues as states of character, by which he means "the things in virtue of
which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions .....2 Virtue is
a particular state of character, one which "both brings into good condition
the thing of which it is the excellence and make the work of that thing be
done well." 3 And further, "the virtue of a man also will be the state.of
character which makes a man good and which makes him do his work
well." 4
Implicit in Aristotle's definition are several crucial ideas. First, virtues
are, as they were for Socrates, excellence (ar~t ). They have a functional and
teleological character since they make things do their work well (cutting, in
2. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nichomachean 1105b, 25-26 (W.D. Ross trans.), in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935 (R. McKeon ed. 1941).
3. Id. at 1106a, 16-17.
4. Id. at 1106a, 22-24.
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the case of a knife, and seeing, in the case of the eye are Aristotle's examples)
and by that fact make the thing itself good.
In the case of humans, virtue makes us function as well as humans to
achieve our ends or purposes. We are thereby made good humans. Defining
human excellence is more difficult than defining the excellence of a knife.
Aristotle addresses that question in both the Nichomachean and the
Eudemian Ethics. I cannot hope to summarize that discussion here.
What is important, however, is that Aristotle's definition of virtue is
linked to two other concepts-the concepts of the nature and the good of
man. It is the fragmentation of the unity among these concepts that is
largely responsible for the confusion we experience today in arriving at some
consensus about the meaning of virtue. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics were
in general agreement, as was Aquinas (with the additional consideration of
man's spiritual nature) on a comprehensive moral philosophy of which virtue was a part. The post-medieval dissolution of this moral philosophy
which we shall shortly examine has left the idea of virtue without roots.
I have no pretensions in this Article that would lead me to attempt to
define the virtuous person, the one who possesses to an excellent degree, the
character traits that make for a good person. But I do believe it is possible to
define the virtues that make for a good physician, lawyer or clergyman in
terms of the ends to which those professions are dedicated.
The term character may be taken in two ways. In a general sense it summates the kind of person one is, as revealed by the virtues and vices we
exhibit in our attitudes and actions. More specifically, a person of character
is one who can predictably be trusted to act well in most circumstances, to
consider others in his or her decisions, to look at the long term meanings of
immediate impulses and to order those impulses according to the canons of
morality. In Aristotle's sense, a person of character (and here I mean virtuous character) is one who "stands well" with reference to the passions, who
does not yield to extremes of self-interest, pleasure, or desires for power.
By "ethics of the professions", I do not mean the norms actually followed
by professionals, or the professional codes they espouse, but rather the moral
obligations deductible from the kinds of activity in which they are engaged.
The ethics of the professions, therefore, consists in a rational and systematic
ordering of the principles, rules, duties and virtues intrinsic to achieving the
ends to which a profession is dedicated. This is the "internal morality" of a
profession. 5
By a profession, I mean something more than the usual, sociological defi5. J. Ladd, The Internal Morality of Medicine: An Essential Dimension of the PatientPhysician Relationship, in THE CLINICAL ENCOUNTER 209 (E.E. Shelp ed. 1983).
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nition. A profession is, literally speaking, a declaration of a way of life that
is specific, a way of life in which expert knowledge is used not primarily for
personal gain but for the benefit of those who need that knowledge. The
fuller meaning of this definition will emerge as my line of argument unfolds.
Altruism and self-interest as I shall use these terms in this Article are
opposing moral concepts. Without entering into a detailed history of these
two ideas I would make the following distinctions: altruism is that trait
which disposes a person to take the interests of others into account in using
power, privilege, position and knowledge. It was first introduced by August
Comte (1798-1857). One need not accept, as I assuredly do not, Comte's
philosophy of humanity and his positivism to use the term as I do. The key
term for the ethics of the professions is altruistic beneficence. This means
not only taking the interests of others into account but doing so in such
fashion that our intentions and acts give some degree of preference to the
intention of others. This is a more elevated notion of beneficence than simple benevolence-wishing others well, and non-maleficence, not doing them
harm. It implies some degree of effacement of self-interest. Altruistic beneficence is particularly important for the professions given the special phenomenology of the professional relationship which I shall define later in this
Article.
Self-interest too, has several meanings. There is a legitimate self-interest
which pertains to the duties we owe to ourselves-duties which guard
health, life, some measure of material well-being, the good of our families,
friends, etc. Aristotle made clear the two senses which self-love may exist in
humans.6 There is also an illegitimate sense of self-interest-at least in the
moral philosophy of virtue and that is selfish self-interest. Here we take into
account the interests of others but we discount them in favor of our own selfinterests. This may be legitimate when taking into account that the good of
others involves heroic degrees of self-sacrifice to the point of discomfort, financial loss, harm to family, or even death. Whether degrees of altruistic
beneficence which require some cost in time, effort, or discomfort are required in ordinary affairs is a debatable question which I shall not engage for
want of time.
The major point in my argument, however, is that, given the nature of
6. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, Bk. 9, Ch. 8. In this chapter, Aristotle distinguishes two

types of self-love: reproachful and virtuous. Reproachful self-love is self-love that arises not
according to'a rational principle but according to passion. The person who loves self in this
way desires what is advantageous, not what is noble. Id. at 1169a, 4-6. The person of reproachful self-love assigns to himself the greater share of wealth, honor, and bodily pleasure.
The person who demonstrates virtuous self-love is inspired by the rational principle to secure
for self the most noble goods. The actions of this person will benefit both himself and others.
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professional relationships, some degree of effacement of self-interest-which
I shall take to mean the same as beneficent altruism-is morally obligatory
on health professionals. A virtuous professional, then, is one who can be
expected with reasonable certainty to exhibit as one of his traits of character,
altruistic beneficence construed as effacement of self-interest. The precise
limits of such a trait, the way in which it would be defined in a specific
instance, is not definable by formula.
Finally, I shall focus only on the three traditional "learned" professions of
medicine, law and ministry. Other occupations like teaching and the military have been called professions in the past and now almost every activity
that requires skill and is done for a living is called a profession. Indeed,
some of the features I shall describe for the learned three will be possessed by
other occupations. But the traditional three are paradigms of professional
ethics because the characteristics which define them are clustered in a unique
way as to degree, kind and number. To the extent that other professions
commit themselves to other than self-interest, they approach the paradigm
professions and what I say applies analogically to them.
II.

WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE EROSION OF VIRTUE AND THE RISE OF

SELF-INTEREST?

Let me turn now to the first of my three questions. What accounts for the
erosion of virtue ethics? I select four factors: a) the unresolved conceptual
tension between virtue and self-interest; b) the conceptual difficulties of virtue ethics itself; c) the modern turn in ethics from the character of the moral
agent to the resolution of dilemmas; and d) the shift in economic and political values in the last decade.
A.

The Inherent Tension Between Virtue and Self-Interest

The tension between self-interest and virtue was recognized at the beginning of western moral philosophy. Plato has Socrates confront this dilemma
in the Republic when Thrasymachus asserts that "justice is simply the interest of the stronger." 7 Glaucon for his part contends that man by nature
pursues self-interest and is deflected only by law-an idea also advanced by
other ethical "relativists" like Thucydides and Gorgias. Callicles goes further and insists that virtue consists in acting selfishly and tyrannically.
W.K.C. Guthrie does how persistent the idea of self-interest and self-love
was in the thought of the Sophists.8
7. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 338C (R.W. Sterling & W.C. Scott trans. 1985).
8. W.K.C. GUTHRIE, THE SOPHISTS (1971). This is a thorough and detailed examination of the idea of self-interest and its relationship to justice in the THE REPUBLIC. It is
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Aristotle too had difficulties with the reality of self-interest and its reconciliation with his doctrine of moral virtue. He asks if one should love ones'
self primarily, or one's neighbor.9 At one point, he tries to show, like so
many philosophers thereafter, that acting to benefit others contributes to
happiness and therefore is in one's own self-interest."l But this is a weak
argument because Aristotle also asserts that the truly virtuous person ought
to practice altruism for its own sake." In his interesting analysis of this
problem in Books VIII and IX of the Eudemian Ethics, Engberg-Pedersen
concludes that Aristotle's position is that justice is the basis of all the virtues.
The virtuous person assigns no more of natural goods to himself than to
others. In this way he encompasses altruism, places restraints on inordinate
self-interest and serves legitimate self-interest. 12
Despite the unresolved difficulties of dealing with the reality of self-interest, the ethics of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics placed the emphasis squarely
on virtues. Virtue ethics dominated classical and Hellenistic moral philosophy. It came to its highest development in the moral philosophy of Aquinas
who joined the supernatural to the natural virtues. Thus the classical and
medieval philosophies of virtue constituted a continuum.
This continuum centered on a conception of the virtuous person as one
who exhibited the traits of character essential to human flourishing, and to
optimal fulfillment of the capabilities inherent in human nature. For such a
person, self-interest was recognized as a responsibility but it was to be submerged to varying degrees of noble acts in the interests of others. The good
life called for a rational balance between personal good and the good of
others.' 3 But the cardinal virtues-temperance, justice, courage and prudence all implied some degree of effacement of self-interest as a mark of the
virtuous person. At a minimum the virtuous person was not to take advantage of the vulnerability of others. As examples: Socrates chose death to
teach moral lesson to his fellow Athenians; Plato distinguished the art of
making money from the art of healing,' 4 Cicero admonished the corn
particularly helpful in its discussion of how Hobbesian and Machiavellian strains were
prefigured in the thinking of the Sophists.
9. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at Bk.9, Ch. 8.
10. See J.M. COOPER, REASON AND HUMAN GOOD IN ARISTOTLE (1975) for a consideration of Aristotle's view on love of self and of others.
11. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 1155b, 31, 1156b 9-10, 1159a 8-12, 28-33. See also
W.F.R. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 326 (1968).
12. See T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF MORAL INSIGHT 237-262
(1983) for a penetrating analysis of EUDEMIAN ETHICS Bks. 8 and 9.
13. HARDIE, supra note 11 says that for Aristotle, "the end of the state is 'greater and
more perfect' than the end of the individual and thus, the activities of the statesman are aimed
at happiness 'for himself and his fellow citizens'." Id. at 216.
14. PLATO, supra note 7, at 341e-347a.
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merchant not to raise prices when the crop was small.I 5 Hippocrates makes
beneficent concern for the welfare of his patients the first principle of medical ethics. 16 Thus while they recognized the reality of self-interest, the ancient and medieval moral philosophers held firmly to virtue as the
touchstone of the moral life.
In the post-medieval period two philosophical assaults were launched on
virtue ethics, one by Machiavelli and the other by Thomas Hobbes. Both are
conceptual descendents of Thrasymachus, Callicles and the anti-virtue preSocratics. Both replaced the optimistic view of human nature with moral
pessimism. Both found the traditional concepts of virtue antiethical to
human nature and self-interest. Machiavelli simply converted the traditional virtues into vices, while Hobbes psychologized them as a form of selfinterest. The Machiavellian and Hobbesian strains are the heart of today's
moral malaise and cynicism which seeks to give moral legitimacy to the professional's self-interest.
B.

The Machiavellian Strain

Machiavelli (1469-1527), was too well educated in classical humanism to
deny totally the value of virtue as an ideal in human conduct. But his observation of the real world in which men lived, in warfare, tyranny and political
upheaval-convinced him that there was no survival value in living virtuously. The good man simply could not thrive in a world in which so many
others were not good. 17 And so Machiavelli advised the Prince he would be
successful to use whatever means would ensure his survival and the continuance of his power. The classical cardinal virtues of temperance, justice, even
at times, fortitude and prudence could be impediments when dealing with
those who ignored these constraints on self-interest. In these circumstances
the virtues, thus, became vices. Moreover, in the Machiavellian view, virtue
itself became an instrumental notion, a power to effect a given end, rather
than a behavioral ideal. Indeed for Machiavelli, virtue became virtd, "manliness"-an expression of power, rather than a disposition to act well as it was
understood in the classical-medieval continuum.
Bernard Mandeville (1670-1773), a physician, went further than
Machieavelli in some ways. Not only did he think the virtues were impractical but he held them to be vices-destructive not only for personal, but so15. See CICERO, DE OFFICIIs Bk 3, Ch. 13 (W. Miller trans. 1913).
16. See Oath of Hippocratesquoted in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1731 (1978).
17. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1970): "This is because, taking everything into ac-

count [the prince] will find that some of the things that appear to be virtues, if he practices
them will ruin him, and some of the things that appear to be wicked will bring him security
and prosperity." Id. at 87.
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cial, good. It is through greed, the desire for luxury, pleasure, and power
that society prospers and things get done. The satisfaction of acquisitiveness, intemperance, and gluttony makes for jobs, puts money into the economy and provides a livelihood for many.1 8 Mandeville's, Fable of the Bees,
whether tongue-in-cheek or not, has been influential in encouraging an antivirtue bias which has always found supporters and has many today.
Nietzsche's (1844-1900) anti-virtue stance was of a different kind but still
in the Machiavellian spirit. For Nietzsche's "ubermensch," the traditional
virtues were meaningless. They were simply impediments to the achievement of greatness. The virtues were for lesser mortals. For the superman,
virtues like temperance or justice would be vices. 19
A more modem exponent of a similar moral viewpoint is Ayn Rand. Her
ideas, though far less well argued than those of Machiavelli, Mandeville or
Nietzsche, are a current compound of all three. Rand's novels of the successful architect or industrialist extol the "virtues" of individualism, ruthlessness, power, and uninhibited pursuit of wealth and self-interest.20 Her
ideas have had a considerable influence on those who seek moral justification
for their acquisitive instincts. In this regard it is interesting to note that the
slogan of Regardie's magazine is "Money, Power, Greed."
Moral Machiavellianism-whether in its original version or its later varieties in Mandeville, Nietzsche, or Rand is very much alive today. We see it
in the medical entrepreneurs who own hospital or nursing homes, the lawyer/power broker who sells influence or leveraged buy outs and in the multimillion dollar ministries. Indeed, all who hold that virtue simply does not
pay and that it is a fool's enterprise are moral Machiavellians.
C. The Hobbesian Strain
Machiavelli made the virtue into vices. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) on
the other hand, tried to maintain some idea of virtue which was reconcilable
and yet reconcile it with self-interest. His was a formal philosophical break
with the medieval tradition. His aim was to establish ethics on purely naturalistic grounds, free of the theological spirit that characterized the medieval
synthesis. He built his moral philosophy on a pessimistic view of human
nature that departed sharply from the essentially optimistic classical-medieval view.
Aristotle opens his Politics by asserting that man is a social animal. Man,
18.

B. MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES (I. Primer ed. 1962).

19. F. NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEOLOGY OF MORALS (W. Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale
trans. 1967).
20. AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1971).
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Hobbes said, was unsocial by nature. He enters society only to satisfy his
most fundamental urges. His selfishness is primary and is expressed in a
desire to preserve his own life, enhance pleasure, avoid pain, and become
secure from attack by others. Hobbes does not make the virtues into vices,
rather he puts them at the service of self-interest. We pity others because we
see the possibility of being in the position of those we pity. We are benevolent in return. "All society" he said "is for gain or glory". 2 We obey society's rules only because we feel if we do not, others will threaten our
security. In Hobbes' view, effacement of self-interest is unnatural, because it
makes us the victims of others. Self-interest determines what is good and
bad. But self-interest alone will not secure a peaceable society,-that must
finally be secured by an absolute sovereign or society will be torn apart by
competing self-interests.
Hobbes' view on self-interest was coupled with a scorn for the idea of the
good which had been vital to classical and medieval philosophy. If the good
is reducible to what we like or dislike, as Hobbes suggested, then virtues and
vices are also matters of preference. Hobbes' powerful assertions shaped
much of English moral philosophy. His successors tried either to rebut the
primacy of self-interest or reconcile it with some more altruistic principle. I
can give only a few examples here.
John Locke (1632-174), for example, agreed with Hobbes that good and
evil are determined by pain or pleasure or conformity to some law. He did
assert that we ought to help others but only if it did not endanger our own
self-interest. Shaftesbury (1671-1713) tried hard to show that self-interest
and service to others were synonymous. Virtues, he said, "pays off" in selfinterest because of the pleasure we get from benevolent acts. The vices like
anger, intemperance, and covetousness, on the other hand, bring pain.
Shaftesbury thought that we ought to embrace virtue because we have an
obligation to protect self-interest, so that affection for virtue is really affection for self-interest. Hutcheson (1694-1746) developed Shaftesbury's moral
sense theory more fully, as did Hume (1711-1776). They identified virtue as
that which gives the spectator of virtuous acts a feeling of approbation while
vicious acts elicit disapproval. They took some of the bluntness out of Hobbes' emphasis in self-interest. But they end up agreeing that we have no
ultimate obligation to virtue other than its bearing on our self-interest or
happiness. Adam Smith (1723-1790) holds that virtues are those traits of
21. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1968); see also SIDGWICK, OUTLINES
OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS (1988). Sidgwick neatly summarizes Hobbes' paradoxical view of
social duty: "a view of social duty in which the only fixed positions were selfishness everywhere and unlimited power somewhere could not but appear offensively paradoxical." Id. at
165.
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character that are useful or agreeable to the moral sentiment of the agent or
others. Bentham (1748-1832) argued that whatever is conducive the general
happiness always conduces the happiness of the agent. In this way his utilitarianism reconciles self-regarding and other-regarding interests by subsuming all of these interests under the principle of greatest happiness. J.S.
Mill (1806-1873) went further than Bentham positing that the greatest good
of all is the source of one's own happiness. One's own self-interest, therefore, is best served by acting for the good of all. According to this view,
consciously doing without happiness to achieve the greatest good of all, is
paradoxically, a source of happiness. 22
In contrast with the moral sentiment, theorists and the utilitarians, the
Cambridge intuitionists like Cudworth (1617-1688) Henry More (16141687), and Cumberland (1631-1718) tried to show that there were reasons
for virtuous acts even if they conflicted with self-interest. More even postulated a "Boniform faculty," a virtue that gives us mastery over our baser
23
impulses to serve selfish interests first.
Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) took issue with both Shaftesbury and
Hobbes. Neither self-love nor benevolence were the only affections involved
in human behaviour. Altruism and self-interest do not completely exclude
other desires and motivations. Nor are benevolence and self-interest mutually exclusive. Man has a conscience which enables him to order his passions so that he can do what is good not just for self. By conscience man can
know how much benevolence will advance and how much will damage his
self-interest. Butler was a cleric and looked to God to implant conscience in
humans to point out what action is most in conformity with human nature.
Thus conscience enables us to know that some things are inherently good
and some inherently bad. Butler thus invoked theology implicitly if not always explicitly, though he tried, as did Hobbes, to extract his moral philosophy from reason.2 4
Enough has been said to demonstrate how the question of altruism and
self-interest arose in Hobbes and Machiavelli and established two powerful
strains of thought with which moral philosophy has been occupied ever
since. As I pointed out earlier, the problem arose in ancient philosophy as
well. In Christian moral philosophy as enunciated by Aquinas, self-preservation was built into natural law. What is owed to self and what is owed to
others was ordered by the virtue of Charity, which entails love for others as
children of God and not for any ulterior purpose. This is the message of the
22. See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism Ch. 2 (G. Sher trans. 1979).
23. H. MORE, ENCHIRIDION ETHICUM (E. Southwell trans. 1930).
24.

J. BUTLER, THREE SERMONS ON HUMAN NATURE (1897).
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Sermon on the Mount. Indeed, it may be that this is the only way in which
the inherent tensions between self-interest and altruism can ever be finally
resolved.
These tensions certainly have not been resolved in 20th century moral
philosophy. The subjectivism and emotivism of Ayer, the prescriptivism of
Hare, the existentialism of Sartre, all make moral judgement matters of approval or disapproval, preference or self-determination. The metaethical
emphasis on language and logic of moral discourse rather than the content
of moral judgments further weakened the classical notions of virtues. As a
result, the definition of virtue has become either so vague as to be meaningless or so encompassing as to include every conceivable likable trait.25
Twentieth century moralists have refined the 18th century notion of moral
sentiment and further psychologized ethics. In the light of the psychologies
of Freud, or the behaviorism of Watson or Skinner, today, many moralists
look to modem psychology to define the virtues and to close the gap between
knowing the good and being motivated to do the good. Others look to genetics, culture or social organization to explain altruism and self-interest.2 6
Nagel, on the other hand, presents a challenge to this trend and argues for
the rationality of altruism. In doing so, he rejects the Humean subordination of reason to desire or emotion.2 7 Philippa Foot tried unsuccessfully to
link virtue and self-interest in her work Virtues and Vices.
The disarray of normative ethics, including the destruction of virtue ethics, has occasioned a spate of recent attempts to resuscitate the classical and
especially the Aristotelian idea of virtue. This more was initiated by Anscombe2 ' and MacIntyre. 29 Their success varies. The extent to which they

can reverse the dominance of self-interest in ethics begun by Hobbes is
highly problematic.
III.

CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF VIRTUE-BASED ETHICS

The second major factor in the erosion of virtue ethics is the philosophical
difficulty inherent in the concept of virtue itself. First, is its lack of specificity. Virtue ethics does not tell us how to resolve specific moral dilemmas. It
deemphasizes principles, rules, duties and concrete prescriptions. It only
says that the virtuous person will be disposed to act in accord with the virtue
appropriate to the situation. This lack of specificity leads to a distressing
25. E.L.

(1986).
26. E. O.
27.

PINCOFFS, QUANDARIES AND VIRTUES:

AGAINST REDUCTIVISM

WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY, THE NEW SYNTHESIS
T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1978).

IN ETHICS

(1975).

28. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958).
29.

A.E. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1984).
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circularity in reasoning. The right and the good is that which the virtuous
person would do, and the virtuous person is one who would do the right and
the good. We must define either the right and the good or the virtuous person if we are to break out of this logical impasse. But, these are just the
definitions that have defied the conceptual ingenuity of the world's best philosophers. Furthermore, virtue theory cannot stand apart from some theory
of human nature and the good. The more vague our definitions of human
nature and its telos, the more difficult it is to keep virtue from becoming vice
and vice virtue. Since virtue ethics puts its emphasis on the character of the
agent it requires a consistent philosophical anthropology; otherwise it easily
becomes subjectivist, emotivist, relativist and self-destructive.
Further difficulties include the relations of intent to outward behavior. Is
good intention a criterion of a virtuous person? How do we determine intention? Can a good intention absolve the agent of responsibility for an act
which ends in harm-a physician telling a patient the truth out of virtue of
honesty, precipitating a serious depression or even suicide? Few are virtuous
all the time. How many lapses moves us from the virtuous to the vicious
category? How does virtue ethics connect with duty-and principle-based
ethics which give the objectivity virtue seems to lack?
Classical ethics in the East and the West have usually eschewed systems of
rules or principles or at least subordinated them to the notion of moral character. Where do virtue and supererogation meet? Are virtues synonymous
with duties? Is supererogation merely a higher degree of virtue? Why are
some people virtuous and others not? Must we turn to sociobiology for the
answer as some suggest?3 ° Are virtues genetically ingrained, mere survival
mechanisms designed to propagate the gene pool?
In spite of its ancient lineage, these fundamental questions are yet to be
answered. Because they have not been answered to everyone's satisfaction,
moralists have turned to something more probable-to the question, what
shall I do? How do I solve this dilemma before me now?

IV.

THE TURN TO QUANDARY SOLVING

This brings me to the third point I want to mention with regard to the
erosion of virtue ethics, namely the turn-particularly in professional ethicstoward quandary and dilemma solving. This is the result of a number of
factors operating in the last two decades. One is the concreteness and urgency of the new ethical issues arising in scientific advance and socio-political change. Medical and biological progress for example, challenge
traditional ethics, and yet, they must be confronted without the ethical com30. WILSON, supra note 26.
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pass points of a consensus on values or common religious beliefs. We are
now a morally heterogeneous society, divided on the most fundamental ethical issues, particularly about the meaning of life and death. Without a common conception of human nature, we cannot agree on what constitutes a
good life and the virtues that ought to characterize it. As a result, the ethics
of the professions, especially of the medical profession, have turned to the
analysis of dilemmas and of the process of ethical decision-making. For
many, ethics consists primarily in a balancing of rights, duties and prima
facie principles and the resolution of conflicts among them. Procedural ethics has replaced normative ethics. This avoids the impasses generated when
patients, clients and professionals hold fundamentally opposing moral
viewpoints.
But analysis cannot substitute for character and virtue-even though it provides conceptual clarity. Moral acts are the acts of human agents. Their
quality is determined by the characters of the persons doing the analysis.
Character shapes the way we define a moral problem, selects what we think
is an ethical issue, and decides which principles, values and technical details
are determinative.
It makes a very great difference, therefore, whether a professional is motivated by self-interest or altruism. Given the realities of professional relationships, the character of the professional cannot be eliminated from its central
position and that is why virtue ethics must be restored as the keystone of the
ethics of the professions.
A fourth and final factor eroding a virtue approach in the medical profession is the legitimation in public attitudes of, and tolerance for, self-interest,
in response to the economic imperatives acting so forcefully on the health
care system. To this end, physicians and other providers have been encouraged to compete with each other. The availability, cost and quality of
health services has been turned over increasingly to market forces. The Federal Trade Commission has classified the professions, yours and mine, as
businesses and made them subject to one ordering principle-the preservation
of competition. 3 Health providers have been encouraged to become entrepreneurs, to invest in health care facilities and technologies, to be offered
bonuses for keeping utilization of health care resources to a minimum.
Without these incentives, it is argued, the best will not enter medicine, or
will retire early. Medical progress would stop and new services would cease
to be available. For the first time in medical history, self-interest has been
given legal and moral legitimation and profit has been turned into a profes31. See generally Pellegrino, What is a Profession? The Ethical Implications of the F T.C.
Order and Some Supreme Court Decisions, 29 SURVEY OF OPHTHALMOLOGY 1 (1984).
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sional virtue. These trends are making the physician into a businessman, an
entrepreneur, a proletarian, a gatekeeper, and a bureaucrat. Never has there
been more confusion about who, and what, it is to be a physician.
V.

Is

THERE A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR RESTORING VIRTUE ETHICS?

This brings me to my second major question-is there a sound philosophical foundation in the nature of professional activity for resolving the tension
between altruism and self-interest in favor of virtue and character? I believe
there is, and I would ground my proposal in six characteristics of the relationship of professionals with those who seek their help. Individually, none
of these phenomena is unique in kind or degree. They may exist individually
in other human relationships and occupations. But, as a moral cluster, they
are, in fact, unique and generate a kind of "internal morality"-a grounding
for the ethics of the professions that is in some way impervious to vacillations in philosophical fashions, as well as social, economic or political
change. This internal morality explains why the ethics of medicine, for example, remained until two decades ago firmly rooted in the ethics of character and virtue. This was true of the medical ethics of the Hippocratic school
and the Stoics, it is found in the seminal texts of Moslem, Jewish and Christian medical moralists. It persisted in the 18th Century in the writing of
John Gregory, Thomas Percival and Samuel Bard, who, although cognizant
of the philosophies of Hobbes, Adam Smith and Hume, nonetheless, maintained the traditional dedication of the profession to the welfare of the patient and to a certain set of virtues. Only in the last two decades has there
been (to use Hume's terms) a "sentiment of approbation" regarding selfinterest.
The first distinguishing characteristic of professional relationships is the
dependence, vulnerability and eminent exploitability of the person who seeks
the help of a physician, lawyer or clergyman. The person in need of help to
restore health, receive justice or rectify his relationships with God is anxious,
in distress and driven by fear. To avoid death, damnation or incarceration,
he is impelled to seek help though he wishes he could avoid it. He is not free
to pursue life's other goals until help is forthcoming.
The second characteristic of professional relationships is their inherent inequality. The professional possesses the knowledge that the patient or client
needs. This places the preponderance of power in his hands. He can use it
well or poorly, for good or evil, for service or self-interest. How can we
speak, as some do, of the professional relationship as a contract when one
party is so dependent upon the other's services?
The third characteristic of professional relationships is their special fiduci-
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ary character. In a state of vulnerability 32 and inequality, we are forced to
trust our physicians, lawyers or ministers. We are ill equipped to evaluate
their competence. We are forced to reveal our intimate selves-baring our
bodies, our personal lives, our souls and our failings to another person who
is a stranger. Without these invasions of our privacy, we cannot be healed or
helped. Moreover, the professional invites our trust. Professionals begin
their relationship with us with the question-how can I help you? Implicitly
they are saying, "I have the knowledge you need,-trust me to have it and to
use it in your best interests." In the case of medicine, that promise is made
in a public oath at the time of graduation when the graduate announces to
all present that, henceforth, he can be trusted to serve interests other than
his own. It is repeated in the codes of medicine and the other professions
and the ordination rites of clergymen.
Indeed, it is the public declaration that defines a true "profession" and
separates it from other occupations. The very word comes from the Latin
profiteri, to declare aloud, to accept publicly a special way of life, one that
promises that the profession can be trusted to act in other than its own interest. Businessmen and craftsmen ask to be trusted, but not at cost to themselves. Caveat emptor can never be the first principle of a profession.
Fourth, the knowledge of true professionals, as I have just defined them,
cannot be wholly proprietary. Their knowledge is ordained to a practical
end, to meeting certain fundamental human needs. Professional knowledge
does not exist for its own sake. This is clearest in medicine where society
permits invasions of privacy that would otherwise be criminal in order that
physicians may be trained. Thus, medical students who are not fully skilled
are permitted to dissect human bodies, attend and assist at autopsies and
operations, and participate in the care of sick people. They are allowed literally to practice albeit under supervision. Surgeons in training take many
years to develop their skills. Their first operations are hardly as proficient as
those which follow. Teaching with patients involves delays, diffusion of responsibility and accountability, and discomfort and even physical risk for
the patient. Society permits these invasions of privacy and the risks attached
to them, not primarily so physicians can make a living, but because society
needs an uninterrupted supply of doctors. Medical knowledge, and analogously, legal and clerical knowledge, are held in trust for those who need
them. They can never be solely dispensed for the profit of the professional or
on terms unilaterally set by him or her. That is why lawyers are officers of
32. See R. E.

A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOThis author proposes vulnerability as a source of moral obligation in his analysis of our social responsibilities.
GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE:

CIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1985).
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the court, and clergymen are ordained to minister in the name of God or
their churches.
The fifth feature of the professional relationship is that the professional is
the final common pathway through which help and harm must pass. The
final decisions, actions, and recommendations must be made by one person,
the professional, with whom the patient or client has a convenantal relationship of trust. No policy, no law, no regulation can be effective unless the
physician, lawyer or minister permits it to influence the professional relationship. Professionals are allowed wide discretion because the needs of
those they serve are unique. Professionals are, thus, guardians of the patient's interest and responsible for any act in which they participate.
The sixth distinguishing characteristic feature of professional relationships
is that the professional is a member of a moral community, that is, a collective human association whose members share the privileges of special knowledge and together pledge their dedication to use it to advance health, justice
or salvation. Together the members of the moral community make the same
promises and elicit the same trust they do as individuals. They are bound by
the same fidelity to the promise they have collectively made and the trust
they have collectively elicited. The professional is, therefore, not a moral
island. He belongs to a group which has been given a monopoly on special
knowledge and holds it in trust for all who need it. Each professional is
responsible to his colleagues and they are together, responsible for him. Collectively, they are responsible for fidelity to the trust they have solicited from
society. This is what the privilege of self-regulation means-not that each professional is his own judge of what is ethically permissible.
These features regarding human relationships are the components of the
"internal morality" of the professions, the immediate moral ground for their
obligations, and the source of definition of their virtues. To use Aristotle's
terminology, those virtues make the work of the professions "be well done."
The virtues of professional life are many, but I believe they are reducible,
primarily to two-fidelity to trust and beneficence, which follows from the
virtue of fidelity to trust. These two traits of character are the ethical foundations upon which the other virtues and principles of professional ethics
depend. Clearly, they are incompatible with the Machiavellian and Hobbesian doctrines of self-interest. Their reality and irreducibility provide the
most powerful argument for the restoration of virtue ethics in professional
morality." a
33. See E. D. PELLEGRINO AND D. C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE
RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE (1988).
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THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF VIRTUE ETHICS

If there is validity in the philosophical foundations of professional morality, a number of practical implications follow which are pertinent to healing
the moral malaise and confusion of today's professionals.
First, professionals cannot displace the moral failings of the professions on
others-on society, other professions, government, economics, the market
place, etc. No one can make the conscientious professional do what he
thinks is not in the interests of his patient or client. Can anyone force doctors to follow a policy damaging to their interests? The fact that the professional is the final common pathway for all policies and decisions and actions
forces him to be the guardian of the interests of his patient or client. Indeed,
he invited that responsibility when he invited the patient or client to trust
him.
As a result, individual practitioners must be very careful in exonerating
themselves from morally dubious practices on the basis of survival. Professional ethics will have no future only if it is gradually suffocated by the
moral compromises of individual professionals. There will be times when, as
guardians of the patients' welfare, physicians will have a moral obligation to
refuse: they will refuse to "dump" the patient who cannot pay; they will
refuse to discharge the patient before he is ready; they will refuse to act as
society's fiscal agents; they will refuse to be seduced by the profits of investments and ownership of health facilities or bonuses for denying or delaying
needed care; they will refuse to be gatekeepers, except to protect their patients from unnecessary medical interventions or procedures. 34 The physician of character will be the one who can reliably be expected to exhibit the
virtues of fidelity to trust and effacement of self-interest.35
The second practical implication is that the individual professional must
not be expected to stand by when the well-being of his patient or client is
threatened. It is an obligation of the professions as moral communities to be
advocates for those they serve and to take collective action to assure that
their services are available and accessible to all, to protect those in need of
healing, justice or salvation against legislation, and public or institutional
policies that may harm them. The professions as moral communities must
also take the responsibility for each member's ethical behavior seriously
enough to monitor, discipline and even remove each other when the canons
34. See Ansberry, Dumping the Poor, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1988, at I col. 1.
35. Engelhardt & Rie, Morality for the Medical IndustrialComplex, 319 NEW ENG. J.

MED. 1086 (1988). These authors argue against the thesis that I am presenting particularly in
their view that traditional standards must be tailored to conform to institutional and thirdparty payer's requirements.
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of professional morality are violated. Think of the enormous moral power
the professions could exort if they were truly the advocates of those they
serve. Suppose that, in addition, all the helping professions were to join their
efforts. Could any society resist? Can they do less? In the face of this
power, can any of the three great professions blame society for their own
36
moral lassitude?
A third implication is that the formation of character is as important in
the education of professionals as their technical education. Although this
was a major concern of professional education in the past, it has now been
forsaken. People have asked ever since Plato raised the question in the
Meno-can virtue be taught? I believe it can. Obviously, the whole task of
character formation cannot be left to the professional schools. Families,
churches and schools, all shape the students' character long before they
enter professional schools. But these schools must also teach what it is to be
a good physician, lawyer or clergyman-what kind of person the good professional ought to be. Much can be done in character formation when a student is motivated by his desire to be a good professional even if his education
prior to medical, law school or seminary was morally neutral or deficient.
The most effective instruments of character formation are the professionals who teach in medical and law schools and seminaries. But they must be
able to demonstrate that competence and character are inseparable, and that
fidelity to trust and self-effacement can be, and must be, indispensable traits
of the authentic profession. Unfortunately, not enough professional school
faculty members are convinced of this or morally equipped to serve as models of virtue.
Paradigm cases of ethically sensitive professionals drawn from the history
and tradition of each profession are also helpful. They are more effective
than is generally realized. One of the tragedies of medical history is its depreciation of the lives of the great physicians. While biographies may not
have much fascination for the sophisticated medical historians, they still
have inspirational value for the aspirants to medicine. Other professions
have their morally paradigmatic biographies as well. Most professional students enter with some ideal of service in mind which the professional school
has a responsibility to re-enforce.
A fourth implication is that cure of the moral malaise of the professions
requires something more than reordering the social organization or tailoring
the semantic and semiotic feature of professional codes as Kultgen rather
36. J. CALLAHAN, ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1988). This is an anthology
dealing with the relationships between professional and ordinary morality with contributions
by philosophers and professionals in law, medicine and business.
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naively supposes. 7 What failings there are in the professions are failing in
character and not in the language of our codes. If character and virtue are
restored, the appropriate social reorganizations will follow-not the other way
around.
Finally, there are theoretical reasons for a restoration of virtue, both in
general and professional ethics. Happily a renaissance of interest among
moral philosophers in this subject is very much in evidence. But virtue ethics must not be seen as self-sufficient or as antithetical to principle for dutybased systems of the analysis of ethical dilemmas. The theoretical challenge
is to develop the logical connections between analytical and virtue ethics,
between principles and character, to close the gap between cognition of the
right and good and the motivation to do it, and in the light of my whole
analysis, to strike the morally defensible balance between self-interest and its
effacement which recognizes the primacy of altruistic beneficence.
The theoretical challenges will be complicated because virtue and dutybased ethics are today isolated from a more comprehensive moral philosophy which could tell us why we must be moral and what we define as the
moral life. We need to reconnect ethics to some notion of the good and to a
coherent philosophical anthropology. To this end it might be well, to reexamine the classical medieval synthesis before ethics was torn from its roots
in moral philosophy. That synthesis, amplified by our newer knowledge of
human nature, derived from the biological and social sciences and reflected
upon theologically, might provide the new resuscitation that an effective virtue ethics demands.
For the time being, a reflection on the nature of professional relationships
can be fruitful even in the absence of a comprehensive moral philosophy of
which it might be a part. The internal morality of the professions, based on
the realities of professional relationships, is clear enough to help us repair
the ozone hole opened in the fabric of professional ethics, even if we cannot
repair the whole moral atmosphere on which our society depends for its
survival.
VII.

CONCLUSION

I have emphasized what I believe to be some of the elements common to
the moral philosophy of the three professions of medicine, law and ministry.
Many of these same features are shared by other professions. I must leave
them to decide how the virtues of fidelity to trust and effacement of selfinterest apply to them. Suppose all the professions were to acknowledge vir37. J.

KULTGEN, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM

4 (1988).
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tue as a ground for moral accountability. Would this not be the leaven for
raising the standards of conventional morality as well?

